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Civil litigants have the right to be heard in federal1 and state2 courts.
The right to be heard has little value, however, to those who lack the
knowledge to exercise their right in a meaningful or skillful way. The
notion of a meaningful right to be heard has been linked to access to coun-
sel.3 In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court noted, "[t]he right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law."' Several commen-
I. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982) ("parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel").
2. In some states, the right to be heard is defined explicitly in terms of a right to prosecute or
defend in person. See, e.g., At.A. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party"); GA. CONS'r. art I, para. XII; MiCaH. CONS-r. art. I, § 13; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 25; UTAH
CoNSr. art I, § 11; WIs. CONSr. art I, § 21(2). In other states, the right to prosecute or defend in
person arises by statute. See, e.g., FtA. STAix. ANN. § 454.18 (Harrison 1978); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2501(a) (Purdon 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.48.190 (1961). In most states, the
constitutional right to be heard is encompassed by the more general right to redress of injuries. See,
e.g., ARK. CoNsr. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL.. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST.
art. 1, § 21; IDAHO CONS.,r . art. I, § 18; It.. CONsT. art. I, § 12; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN.
CONSIr. Bill of Rights, § 18; Ky. CONsr. § 14; LA. CONs-r. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19;
MD. CONs-r. Declaration of Rights, art. 19; MASS. CONST. art. XI; MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 8; Mo.
CONsr. art. I, § 14; MONTr. CONsT. art. I, § 16; N.H. CONsr. Bill of Rights, art. 14; N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 18; OHIo CONSI. art. I, § 16; OKI.A. CONSir. art. II, § 6; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I.
CONr. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONsr. art. I, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17;
TEX. CON1r. art. I, § 13; VT. CONSt. ch. I, art. 4; W. VA. CONs-r. art. III, § 17; Wyo. CONST. art.
I, § 8.
3. See, e.g., Freedman, Lawyer-Client Confidences and the Constitution (Book Review), 90 YALE
L.J. 1486, 1494 (1981):
[Ojur social institutions are so complex that, without the assistance of an expert adviser, a lay
person cannot exercise the personal autonomy to which he or she is morally and constitution-
ally entitled. "Without such an adviser ... the law would impose constraints on the lay
citizen (unequally at that) which it is not entitled to impose explicitly."
Id. at 1494 (quoting Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YA.E L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976)); see also Cheatham, The Lawyer's Role and Surround-
ings, 25 ROcKY MTN. L. REV. 405 (1953):
Law is not self-applying; men must apply and utilize it in concrete cases. But the ordinary
man is incapable. He cannot know the principles of law or the rules guiding the machinery of
law administration; he does not know how to formulate his desires with precision and to put
them into writing; he is ineffective in the presentation of his claims.
Id. at 405.
4. 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (quoted in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963)).
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tators have argued that the logic of Powell applies no less to civil litigants,
and that the due process clause mandates a right to counsel for civil liti-
gants, as well. 5
This Note, however, argues that provision of counsel need not be the
only solution to the pro se litigant's dilemma: Lawyers and paralegals can
assist the pro se litigant by educating her about her legal situation. Expe-
rience has shown that providing general legal information to pro se liti-
gants can significantly increase their chances of success both in court and
in settlement negotiations.'
Civil litigants who are unable to hire counsel cannot rely on obtaining
counsel from other sources to ensure a meaningful right to be heard. In
only limited circumstances are civil litigants constitutionally entitled to
court-appointed counsel. 7 Legal services programs,8 the primary source of
individual attorney representation for the indigent,9 are turning away
many eligible persons1 ° because they cannot meet the demand for their
services.' Furthermore, other sources of legal assistance have been unable
5. Since Gideon, in which the Supreme Court relied heavily upon Powell in declaring that an
indigent criminal defendant's right to counsel is a fundamental one, several commentators have argued
for the application of the Court's reasoning in Powell to indigent civil litigants. See Note, The Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966); Note, The Emerging Right of Legal
Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 554 (1976); Note, The Indi-
gent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
6. According to New Haven Legal Assistance Association, Inc. (NHLAA), tenants who received
summary eviction notices and then received "brief service" at NHLAA-one-half hour informational
consultations with paralegals-fared markedly better in pro se capacity than tenants who did not. The
NHLAA study showed that the informed tenants obtained significantly longer time in their premises
than their uninformed counterparts. See D. Pollack, Advice Only/Brief Service Effectiveness Study for
New Haven Legal Assistance Ass'n, Inc. 2-3 (Aug. 26, 1986) (on file with author) (brief service
recipients received 77 days, as opposed to 44 days for other pro se tenants). But the study also showed
that brief service recipients often obtained longer stays of execution at the price of paying more ar-
rearages to the plaintiff/landlord. Id.
7. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
8. As of June 18, 1985, 324 independent legal service programs received financial support from
the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to provide legal assistance in civil matters to the indigent.
LEGAt. SERVICES CORPORA'TION, 1985 FIELD PROGRAM DATA 1, 16 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 FIELD
PROGRAM DATA]. The Legal Services Corporation is an autonomous, non-profit organization created
and funded by Congress to provide "financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings
or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance." Legal Services Corporation Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 1003, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1982)).
While a few legal service organizations do not receive funding from LSC, LSC "provides funds to
almost all legal aid programs in the country." Legal Services Corporation Reauthorization: Hearings
on H.R. 2506 and H.R. 3480 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administra-
tion of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 682 (1981).
9. For a historical survey of civil legal services for the poor, see J. Dooley & A. Houseman, Legal
Services History (Nov. 1984) (unpublished manuscript); see also Special Project, The Legal Services
Corporation: Past, Present, and Future?, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 593, 593-612 (1983).
10. Eligibility for LSC funding is determined by guidelines promulgated by the LSC under the
Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 1007, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f (1982)).
11. For example, NHLAA served a poverty population of 63,000 in New Haven, handled 3,000
cases through its staff attorneys, reached 10,000 others with self-help information, and referred 6,500
cases to other organizations or private attorneys in 1984. See Pamphlet from New Haven Legal Assis-
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Legal Education for Pro Se Litigants
to fill the gap.12 Finally, non-attorney sources of legal information, such
as self-help literature," even if available, are inherently of limited util-
ity. 4 Despite these disadvantages, pro se litigants are often held to the
same standard of knowledge as licensed attorneys.1
This Note proposes that legal services programs consider an alternative
to attorney representation: Attorneys or paralegals can educate prospective
pro se litigants through classroom instruction in which legal problems
common to the community are addressed and explained." Classroom in-
struction can help the pro se litigant understand and effectively present
her legal position in court. Armed with general knowledge of the relevant
substantive and procedural law, as well as standardized legal documents,"
the pro se litigant can more successfully present her claims or defenses
before a court.
Section I of this Note discusses the judicial hostility that pro se litigants
may encounter when exercising their right to be heard, and the una-
voidability of appearing pro se due to the limited availability of legal as-
sistance. Section II describes classroom education as a viable means of
providing legal information. Section III addresses possible arguments
against the delivery of legal information through classes, and, in particu-
lar, the applicability of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility'8
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.'9 Finally, Section IV pro-
tance Ass'n to Friends of Legal Services (on file with author) [hereinafter New Haven Pamphlet]. On
average, three out of every four eligible persons who applied for services were turned away because of
insufficient staff. See Letter from Peter B. Cooper, President of Friends of Legal Services for South
Central Connecticut (November 1986) (on file with author); see also Arriola & Wolinsky, Public
Interest Practice in Practice: The Law and Reality, 34 HASTINC.S L.J. 1207, 1207 & n.43 (1983).
12. See infra note 52. Other sources of legal assistance include law firms and private attorneys
who agree to provide legal services to clients on a flat-fee or fee-for-service basis; prepaid legal services
plans; legal clinics; voucher systems; and pro bono programs. For a description of these modes of
delivery, see generally ABA SPECIAL. COMM. ON THE DELivERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, MODEL LAW-
YERs GUIDE TO LE;A. SERVIClRs (1983).
13. See infra note 59.
14. See infra Section I.A.3.
15. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
16. Although this Note focuses on legal services programs, meaning LSC-funded legal aid pro-
grams that assist eligible people, see supra note 10, private law firms and clinics servicing primarily
low-income clients should also consider offering classroom instruction for pro se litigants. Those who
are just above the poverty level and are ineligible for legal aid programs present "one of the great
unmet legal needs in our society today." ABA, FINAl. REPORT OF THiE SPECIAL COMMITrEE TO
SURVEY LEGAL. NEE s 53 (1978).
17. For a discussion of standardized, as opposed to individualized legal services, see Hazard,
Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed To Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Ser-
vices, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1090-91, 1100-03 (1983); Muris & McChesney, Advertising and
the Price and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
179, 191-93.
18. MODE. CODE OF PROFES ;IONAL. RESPONSIBII.YrY (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
19. MOE.L Rvims OF PROFEsSIONAL. CONDUG'I" (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The Model
Rules were adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 2, 1983.
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poses standards grounded in tort law that should govern the conduct of
lawyers and paralegals who teach pro se litigants.
I. EXERCISING THE RIGHT To BE HEARD
Our courts are based on an adversarial system that relies upon knowl-
edgeable parties on both sides of the controversy to focus, develop, and
present all relevant facts and legal arguments to the court.2" The parties
are not only assured the opportunity, but also bear the burden21 of doing
so. Consequently, our adversarial system may work unfairly22 for those
who are unable either to assert effectively legal rights on their own behalf
or to hire a lawyer for that purpose.23
For this reason, some courts have granted pro se litigants a degree of
special consideration. In Haines v. Kerner,2 ' the Supreme Court held that
a pro se litigant's pleadings must be liberally construed. In the spirit of
Haines, some courts have sought to protect pro se litigants from forfeiture
20. It is commonly acknowledged that our adversarial system is not a truth-seeking venture, but a
means to resolve disputes based only on information presented to the adjudicator. As Judge Marvin E.
Frankel has noted, "[Tihe contest by its very nature is not one in which the objective of either side, or
of both together, is to expose 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.'" M. FRANKEL,
PARTISAN JUSTICE 14 (1980). "The deciders, though commissioned to discover the truth, are passive
recipients, not active explorers. They take what they are given. They consider the questions raised by
counsel, rarely any others. Issues not joined are not resolved, though they might have led to wiser,
fairer dispositions than those reached." Id. at 13. For discussions on adversarial justice, see M. FRAN-
KEL, THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH-AN UMPIREAL VIEW (1975) [hereinafter M. FRANKEL, THE
SEARCH FOR TRUTH]; S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1984); Dauer & Leff, The Lawyer
as Friend (Correspondence), 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Simon, The Ideology of Ad-
vocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29; White, The Ethics of
Arguments: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849 (1983).
21. In Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Wyo. 1984), the Wyoming Supreme Court
rejected a pro se plaintiff's assertion that the trial court should have asked questions or suggested that
plaintiff produce evidence necessary to supplement or clarify the case; the court found that such con-
duct would be inconsistent with the impartial position required of all judges.
22. A trial judge may invoke judicial discretion to assist the pro se litigant, and, in fact, it is
common practice to do so. Yet, despite good intentions, the judge's assistance may not be sufficient to
overcome disadvantages resulting from the lack of counsel. As Judge Frankel has noted:
The fact is that our system does not allow much room for effective or just intervention by the
trial judge in the adversary fight about the facts. The judge views the case from a peak of
Olympian ignorance. His intrustions will in too many cases result from partial or skewed
insights. . . He runs a good chance of pursuing inspirations that better informed counsel
have considered, explored, and abandoned after fuller study. He risks at a minimum the sup-
plying of more confusion than guidance by his sporadic intrusions.
M. FRANKEI., THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH, supra note 20, at 22.
23. In the context of cases handled by legal services programs, one commentator observed:
It is almost certain that an individual acting without an attorney could not have prevailed
.... Indeed, absent legal advice, either the poor person would not have recognized that a
legal issue was presented, or would not have known how to institute litigation or assert a
defense. The skills of a lawyer were vital to developing the facts, arguing the law, negotiating
settlements or preparing pleadings.
Special Project, supra note 9, at 629.
24. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
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of important rights when a pro se litigant's actions stem from ignorance of
procedural matters.25 Other courts, however, have expressed no sympathy
for the pro se litigant, even on procedural matters. 8
The courts appear to agree, however, that it is not necessary to provide
pro se litigants with guidance or information concerning relevant substan-
tive law.27 In fact, some courts have held the pro se litigant to the same
standard of substantive legal knowledge as a licensed member of the bar.28
Thus, for those who, because of their financial inability29 to hire counsel,
25. See, e.g., Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391 (W.Va. 1984) (declaration of mistrial overturned
because pro se litigant's opening remarks constituted excusable mistake). The court said:
We are not proposing that trial judges should become surrogate attorneys for pro se litigants.
The fundamental tenet that the rules or procedures should work to do substantial justice,
however, commands that judges painstakingly strive to insure that no person's cause or defense
is defeated solely by reasons of their unfamiliarity with procedural or evidentiary rules.
Id. at 396 (footnote omitted); see also Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1983) (default judgment
set aside where pro se defendant did not know she faced default if she did not answer complaint
within 20 days).
26. The court in Homecraft Corp v. Fimbres, 119 Ariz. 299, 301, 580 P.2d 760, 762 (1978)
noted: "Experience . . . indicates that all too often litigants who appear in propria persona deliber-
ately attempt to capitalize upon their own ignorance or appearance of ignorance." (quoting Monas-
tero v. Los Angeles Transit Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 156, 162, 280 P.2d 187, 192 (1955)). The trial
court entered a $10,000 execution against pro se defendants' home to satisfy a $450 judgment. There-
after, defendants retained counsel and moved for relief from the judgment. That trial court, noting,
"lilt is obvious that the Defendants Fimbres without the benefit of counsel had no real conception or
understanding of the legal processes," 119 Ariz. at 300, 580 P.2d at 761, granted defendants' motion
for relief and set aside thejudgment. The appellate court, however, found that the trial court erred in
setting aside the judgment, and refused to compensate for defendants' disadvantages. See also Sun-
power Inc. v. Hawley, 296 N.W.2d 532, 533 (S.D. 1980) (pro se party may not capitalize on unfa-
miliarity with law).
27. See, e.g., Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) ("Reasonable consideration
for a layman acting as his own attorney does not require the court to . . . translate legal terms,
explain legal rules, or otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing consequences of the party's decision to
function in a capacity for which he is not trained."); Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1984)
(rejecting pro se litigant's request for court assistance in determining evidence necessary to establish
prima facie case).
28.
When one undertakes to represent himself he . . . is held to the same familiarity with re-
quired procedures and the same notice of statutes and local rules as would be attributed to a
duly qualified member of the bar.. . . As far as the law is concerned, the parties were on an
equal footing with regard to legal principles and procedures.
Homecraft Corp., 119 Ariz. at 301-02, 580 P.2d at 762-63.
Another court acknowledged that while it has "a duty to be courteous and fair. . . it has no duty
to practice law for the pro se litigant." Sunpower, 296 N.W.2d at 533. Plaintiff had sued to recover
the amount owed to it for the sale and installation of solar collectors. Pro se defendant failed to
answer plaintiff's complaint, but asserted at the hearing on plaintiff's motion for default judgment
that he did not pay because the solar collectors were defective. Nonetheless, the court entered a default
judgment and denied defendant's motion to set aside the judgment. In justifying its decision, the court
remarked that "'[a pro se litigant] may not capitalize on his unfamiliarity with law; he is bound by
the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required by those who are duly licensed to practice
law.'" Id. (quoting Stark v. Stark, 79 S.D. 178, 181, 109 N.W.2d 904, 906 (1961)). Apparently, the
court's concept of its duty to be fair did not preclude penalizing the pro se defendant for failure to
assert his defense in a formal answer, despite the defendant's oral presentation of his defense.
29. A person who is financially able to hire an attorney, but whose claim is worth less than the
cost of hiring an attorney, is in the same position as the indigent litigant: If she chooses to exercise her
right to be heard at all with respect to that claim, she will do so without the benefit of counsel. For
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must exercise their right to be heard without the benefit of counsel-if
they are to be heard at all-the consequences of bearing that risk can be
harsh.30
The cases reflect the obvious tension between a court's desire to protect
the ignorant pro se litigant and the need to preserve the integrity of the
adversarial system in which the court is the passive adjudicator. The fact
that courts have opted to maintain their functional integrity should not be
surprising. Courts cannot be expected to assume the awkward position,
not to mention the imposition, 31 of serving as both adjudicator and counsel
for the pro se litigant. Such a position would place the court in conflict
with the very structure of the adversarial system. 2
A. Obtaining Legal Assistance to Exercise the Right To Be Heard
Among the solutions that will relieve courts of this dilemma are the
provision of legal counsel and a knowledgeable pro se litigant.3 3 Current
methods available for assisting those unable to hire counsel have insuffi-
ciently answered their legal needs.
1. Limited Availability of Court-Appointed Counsel
In contrast to criminal defendants, civil litigants unable to afford coun-
sel generally cannot turn to the court for appointment of counsel. 34 While
discussions on the factors influencing a layperson's decision to hire counsel or litigate, see R. POSNER,
ECONOMm ANAI.YSIS OF LAW §§ 21.8-21.9 (3d ed. 1986); Project, An Assessment of Alternative
Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122, 131-38 (1980) (theory of fac-
tors influencing layperson's decision to consult attorney); Note, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The
Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1515, 1541-42 (1984) (analy-
sis of factors influencing layperson's decision to litigate, with or without counsel).
30. See infra Section II.
31. See Special Project, supra note 9, at 668-69 and citations therein (discussing burdens that pro
se litigants impose on time and resources of judges, law clerks, and clerical employees).
32. See, e.g., Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Wyo. 1984) ("Although a litigant should
not be punished for self-representation, it is not the function of the court to supervise him in the
practice of law.").
33. A pro se litigant receiving legal education should properly inform the court that she has had
limited access to some source of legal information. Courts generally want to know the extent to which
parties are knowledgeable about the law. Unacknowledged legal assistance may even invoke repri-
mand from the court. See, e.g., Klein v. H.N. Whitney, Goadby & Co., 341 F. Supp. 699, 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding that pro se litigant's arguments and papers "strongly suggest that he is
enjoying the assistance of a lawyer" and that such practice "should not be countenanced").
While the court and the bar may have an understandable stake in proscribing deception before the
court, prohibiting pro se litigants from seeking any legal assistance would be unnecessarily broad.
Assistance from counsel not of record should be condemned only if the legal assistance is so extensive
that the litigant is not, in fact, appearing pro se. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978) (pro se litigant received such extensive legal assistance-lawyer
"sat in on" trial and advised litigant on "procedural matters" during trial-that lawyer was found to
be engaging in misrepresentation).
34. The courts have consistently rejected the right to appointed counsel in civil cases, except under
special circumstances. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (rejecting abso-
lute rule requiring appointed counsel in civil cases under due process clause); Aiello v. Commissioner
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most criminal defendants enjoy a constitutional right to counsel, 5 no par-
allel right has yet been recognized in civil cases.3 6 Courts have construed
due process to require the appointment of counsel in particular types of
civil cases, such as mental commitment proceedings"' and juvenile delin-
quency determinations; 8 but, for the ordinary, indigent civil litigant, as
one court put it: "There is a presumption that there is no right to ap-
pointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physi-
cal liberty."' 39 In passing upon motions for appointment of counsel in civil
cases, however, judges enjoy broad discretion in denying counsel. 40
Although appointed counsel may not be constitutionally required, fed-
eral courts41 and some state courts42 are empowered by statute to appoint
counsel for parties appearing in forma pauperis. Some attorneys, however,
have successfully challenged the courts' power to compel representation
without compensation, even when authorized by statute;43 thus, even
when courts are inclined to appoint counsel, the court's ability to "ap-
of Pub. Welfare, 358 Mass. 91, 260 N.E.2d 662 (1970) (holding that neither due process nor equal
protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment required payment of legal fees); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d
433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975) (rejecting claim of constitutional right to counsel in
divorce proceeding); In re Brown v. Lavine, 37 N.Y.2d 317, 333 N.E.2d 374, 372 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975)
(holding that due process does not require assignment of counsel in welfare hearing); cf Kennedy v.
Wood, 439 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Ind. App. 1982). The court in Kennedy held that an indigent defend-
ant was entitled to counsel in a paternity suit instituted under federal acts and statutes because of
potential deprivation of physical liberty. In deciding what due process was required, the court consid-
ered the private interests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that procedures used would
lead to an erroneous decision.
35. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (constitutional right under due process clause
to appointed counsel in criminal cases); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (same).
36. See supra note 5; see also McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counsel for Divorce Liti-
gants, 14 J. FANM. L. 509 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); F.J. v. State, 411 N.E.2d 372, 377 (Ind. App.
1980).
38. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
39. Kennedy v. Wood, 439 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Ind. App. 1982).
40. See, e.g., United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (appointment of
counsel in civil cases within discretion of trial court and made only in exceptional circumstances), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 958 (1982); Craigo v. Hey, 345 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1986) (appointment of counsel
in civil cases within sound discretion of court); Darnell v. Peyton, 208 Va. 675, 160 S.E.2d 749
(1968) (same).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982); see also McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir.
1982) (affirming court's authority to appoint counsel; rejecting argument that court may not appoint
counsel unless authorized to compensate appointed counsel).
42. See, e.g., IND. ConE ANN. § 34-1-1-3 (Burns 1972) (court "shall assign [to an indigent] an
attorney to defend or prosecute the cause"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 514.040 (Vernon 1952) (court may
assign counsel to poor person); VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-183 (1985) (same); W. VA. CODE § 59-2-1
(1966) (same). But see ARK. SrAT. ANN. §§ 27-401 to -406 (1979) (repealed 1985) (former statute
granting court power to appoint counsel for poor person).
43. See, e.g., State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). The Missouri
Supreme Court held that its state courts may no longer compel uncompensated representation in civil
cases, pursuant to Mo. SrAT. ANN. § 514.040 (Vernon 1952), since doing so violates attorneys' state
constitutional right to "the enjoyment of gains of [person's] own industry." 688 S.W.2d at 769.
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point" counsel may be contingent upon its ability to locate volunteer attor-
neys or upon statutory authority to compensate appointed counsel.
2. Legal Services Programs
Legal services programs are the primary source44 of legal assistance for
the poor. If fortunate, those individuals eligible for federally-funded legal
assistance may receive the assistance of a legal services attorney.45 A legal
services attorney, in most cases, accepts46 and handles47 legal problems
just as a private attorney would; the main difference is that clients do not
compensate legal services attorneys for their services.4'8 But, it is clear that
legal assistance from legal services programs is a scarce resource,'4  and
dramatic reductions in federal assistance have exacerbated its scarcity. 50
44. See supra note 9.
45. In New Haven, Connecticut, three out of four eligible persons who applied to the New Haven
Legal Assistance Association, Inc. for legal assistance could not obtain any legal assistance in 1984
whatsoever, let alone assistance from a legal services attorney. See New Haven Pamphlet, supra note
11.
46. Like private attorneys, legal services programs may limit the scope of services that they offer,
and may refuse to offer services. The argument that limitations on services are improper because the
indigent have nowhere else to turn for legal services was rejected by the American Bar Association.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334, at 8-9 (1976) ("legal aid
society may broadly limit the categories of legal services its lawyers may undertake for a client";
"limitation upon the scope of services [should be] established prior to the acceptance by the staff
lawyer of representation of any particular client").
47. Once a legal services staff attorney accepts a matter, "nothing can be permitted to interfere
with that representation to the full extent permitted by law and the disciplinary rules . . . ." Id. at 9
(referring to MODEL ConE, supra note 18). The ABA disallowed a legal services program from
establishing a system of priorities that resulted in an unmanageable caseload for staff attorneys and an
inadequate quality of legal services. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1359 (1976). Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A) provides that "A lawyer shall not:
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
48. Instead of receiving compensation directly from clients, legal services staff attorneys receive
salaries-averaging $21,009 in 1984-funded by LSC, state and local grants, non-LSC federal grants,
and private donations. 1985 FIELn PROGRAM DATA, supra note 8, at 25. In 1985, LSC funded 4,767
attorneys. Id. at 23.
49. As scarce as legal services resources have been in New Haven, Connecticut, see supra note 11,
many poverty areas in the country have fared significantly worse. The poverty community served by
Legal Services of Central Michigan received only $4.84 per person in legal assistance, as compared to
$9.66 per person for poverty community served by SCCLSC. 1982-1983 LEGAL. SERVICE.S CORPORA-
TION ANNUAL. REPORT 17-22. SCCLSC has since merged into New Haven Legal Assistance Associ-
ation, Inc.
50. Congress appropriated $305 million to LSC for the 1981 fiscal year, but reduced appropria-
tions to $241 million for the 1982 fiscal year, a reduction of twenty-five percent. Appropria-
tions-Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-536, 94 Stat. 3166 (1980); H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.;
127 Cong. Rec. H3073, 3117-19 (daily ed. June 18, 1981); H.R. 4169, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; and 127
Cong. Rec. S13368 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1981). This funding level was maintained through a series of
continuing resolutions through 1983. In 1984, Congress appropriated $275 million to LSC. Continu-
ing Appropriations, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733, 738-40 (1983); Continuing Appropria-
tions, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071, 1088 (1983). And in 1985, Congress appropriated
$305.5 million. See Congressional Quarterly 1153 (June 15, 1985). For a discussion of the effect of
the 1982 budget cuts on legal services programs, see THE WASHING;'I'ON COUNCIL OF LAWYERS,
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To give proper assistance to clients whose cases are accepted, a legal ser-
vices program must turn away any excess demand. Some legal services
programs have been forced to routinely deny services to ensure quality
services for urgent legal problems, and long waiting lists for some types of
legal problems are common. 1
At the same time, other sources of legal services, including pro bono
services provided by the private bar, have been unable to fill the gap.52 As
one commentator has noted:
R'.PORT ON "iHe STATus OF LEGAL. SIERVICIES FOR THE POOR 13-42 (1983) (assessing impact of 25%
reduction in federal funding; some programs reporting reduction of over 50% of attorney staff); see
also Special Project, supra note 9, at 611 n.186 (many rural offices forced to close, total staff reduced
by 29.8%).
Since 1980, the Reagan Administration has been calling for the abolition of the LSC. The Adminis-
tration's most recent advocate has been W. Clark Durant III, chairman of the LSC, who told the
American Bar Association's Board of Governors, "I am calling for the replacement of the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation. It cannot be reformed .... " Address by W. Clark Durant III, Chairman of the
LSC, American Bar Association Board of Governors Winter Meeting (Feb. 12, 1987) (copy on file
with author). The American Bar Association has continued to resist the abolition of the LSC and has
called for Durant's resignation. See Nat'l L.J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 12, col. 1 (editorial).
Meanwhile, state and local governments have not been forthcoming in supplementing legal services
programs. In 1985, state and local governments contributed only $20,067,745, or 6.7%, of the LSC
budget. 1985 FIEI.D PROGRAM DATA, supra note 8, at 14.
51. See, e.g., J. Dooley & A. Houseman, supra note 9, at 27 of ch. 4; see also S. BRAKEL,
JUDIARE 71 (1974) (noting decline in number of domestic cases handled because of policy, estab-
lished for budgetary reasons, restricting divorce cases). The NHLAA Family Law Unit is often forced
to limit its caseload to emergency situations, such as spousal or child abuse and potential child kidnap-
ping cases. Telephone interviews with Robin Murphy, Managing Attorney for Family Law Unit, and
Barbara Rey-Deloatch, Paralegal at New Haven Legal Assistance Association (Mar. 3, 1986).
The American Bar Association has noted:
As a practical matter, the resources of a legal services office are always limited and some
allocation of them upon a basis of priorities must be made if they are to be effectively utilized.
As long as this is done fairly and reasonably with the objective of making maximum legal
services available, within the limits of available resources, it is not improper.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334, at 9 (1974).
52. See supra note 11. According to an LSC study that tested various methods of delivery as
demonstration projects, prepaid legal services plans, legal clinics, and voucher systems were not feasi-
ble delivery systems for poor people. See LEGAI. SERV. CORP., THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A
Pomic:y REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (1980) [hereinafter
DELIVERY SYSTEM STUDY]. Even when fully operational in communities already served by a regular
legal services program, most demonstration projects encountered the same problem of excess demand
faced by regular legal services programs, and either had to close intake or reduce their level of new
clients to stay within LSC-prescribed budgets. Id. at 11.
Samuel Brakel, project director of the American Bar Foundation's two-year study of judicare, how-
ever, concluded that judicare is well designed to reach the poor. S. BRAKEL, supra note 51, at 124-25.
Based upon his study of judicare programs in three Wisconsin counties, Brakel concluded that judi-
care is superior to the staff-office model in several areas: in ability to reach the poor, in offering the
client a choice of lawyers, and in quality of service. Id. at 123-29.
Prepaid legal services plans and legal clinics have been successful only when geared to middle-
income people. See Lewin, Legal Advice: $6.75 a Month, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1987, at DI, col. 3
("different concerns, including . . . legal clinics, are scrambling to carve out a piece of . . . that
market [of middle-income Americans]"). These services cannot remain financially solvent when the
clientele consists primarily of low-income people. See D. MARON, LEGAL CLINICS: ANALYSIS AND
SURVEY 15-23 (2d ed. 1977). Nor has the private bar filled the gap. See WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF
LAWYERS, supra note 50, at 43-48; see also J. Dooley & A. Houseman, supra note 9, at 26-27 of
ch. 4; Arriola & Wolinsky, supra note 11, at 1218.
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[P]ro bono services satisfy at present . . . only a small and haphaz-
ardly selected portion of the legal needs of the poor. Indeed, it was
the inadequacy of private legal aid programs and pro bono activities
by individual attorneys that led to the establishment of federally
funded legal services in the first place. 3
In addition, various theories on maximizing the existing resources of
legal services programs have made little headway in reaching individual
members of the low-income community. Some scholars have advocated the
use of impact litigation 4 or class action suits;55 in practical terms, how-
ever, group litigation is not designed to address specific problems of indi-
viduals.56 Another proposal to increase the availability of legal assistance
is the use of lay representatives 5 -presumably a less expensive resource
than attorneys. The use of lay representatives, such as trained paralegals
and social workers, could increase the dissemination of legal information.
Not surprisingly, this proposal has encountered staunch opposition from
the bar and has been rejected by at least one state court.58
3. Publications and Self-Help Materials
Currently, many states allow a pro se litigant to obtain general legal
information from written publications. 9 But publications obviously can-
53. Special Project, supra note 9, at 638 (footnotes omitted).
54. Impact litigation refers to work that aims to achieve "long-lasting improvement, or avoidance
of deterioration, in the living conditions of significant segments of the eligible population." DF;IuVtRY
SYSTE.MS SiTmY, supra note 52, at 31. Critics charge that the resources necessary to prepare and
litigate "impact" cases would be better spent on smaller, nonpolitical matters. For a description of this
debate, see B. GARTH, NEi HBORHOOD LAW FIRMS FOR THiE POOR 172-78 (1980); see also Brakel,
Legal Services for the Poor in the Reagan Years, 68 A.B.A. J. 820, 821 (1982) (objecting to emphasis
on "group representation and so-called impact litigation at the expense of individual service re-
quests"); Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C.L. RF v. 282 (1982) (same).
55. See generally Failinger & May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Rep-
resentation, 45 OHio S'r. L.J. 2 (1984) (discussing maximization of legal services for poor through
class action suits); Special Project, supra note 9, at 633-34 (discussing need for group advocacy).
56. See Breger, supra note 54. Breger attacks proponents of class action and impact litigation, and
instead, advocates a theory of "access rights" under which a person should be entitled to free legal aid
regardless of the moral or social utility of their particular claim. Id. at 297-336. Breger argues that
since the needs and desires of each individual are equally worthy of respect, legal aid organizations
should not select recipients of assistance based upon a judgment of moral or social worth. Impact
litigation, he argues, is not justifiable because it is inherently selective. Id. at 295-97.
57. Advocates of lay presentation have focused on no-fault, uncontested divorces and simple trans-
actions, such as wills and deeds. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 S-rAN. L. Rxv. 1 (1981); Hicks &
Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies, 41 YAI.o L.J. 69 (1931); Note, supra note
29.
58. See Thomas, The Hidden Agency of the Radical Right, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1987, § 3, at 2,
col. 3. The author, Eugene C. Thomas, is president of the American Bar Association.
59. Some states, including New York, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey and Oregon, have ex-
empted written publications and "do it yourself" kits providing general legal information and blank
legal forms from rules against unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., New York County Lawyers'
Ass'n v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967); State v. Winder, 42
1650
Vol. 96: 1641, 1987
Legal Education for Pro Se Litigants
not be as effective as instruction that is narrowly targeted to the person's
particular problems. Even assuming self-help manuals are accurate, well-
written, and easy to comprehend, they do not afford the pro se litigant the
opportunity to ask questions or clarify the material. To proceed effec-
tively, a pro se litigant needs direct access to general information pertinent
to her legal problem.
II. LEGAL EDUCATION FOR THE PRO SE LITIGANT
For some pro se litigants, legal education may constitute the sole source
of information to which they have access, given the scarcity of free legal
services and the limited circumstances in which court-appointed counsel
can be expected. Whether she proceeds pro se by choice or necessity, the
pro se litigant must obtain information that both clarifies the legal bases
of her claims and explains the relevant procedural rules to be able to
make an effective presentation before the court. A better-educated pro se
litigant may still fare better if she were represented by counsel, but the
alternative-leaving the litigant in total ignorance-is clearly much worse,
for both the litigant and the court. Access to such information may even
encourage those who would otherwise forego an opportunity to present
their claims in court to exercise their right to be heard.
Legal education in a classroom setting will not be appropriate for all
legal problems, and its usefulness will depend on the needs of the commu-
nity. Whether a legal problem is suitable for classroom instruction will
A.D.2d 1039, 348 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1973); State Bar v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W.2d 1 (1976);
Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913 (Or. 1976); Sup. Ct. Comm'n on the Unauth. Prac. of
Law, Op. 20, 100 N.J.L.J. 893 (1977).
Indeed, preventing laypersons from publishing nonpersonalized legal information or advice appears
to violate the First Amendment. Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 105 S. Ct. 2557, 2574 (1985) (White, J., concur-
ring). Although Lowe addressed the regulation of publishers of nonpersonalized investment advice,
Justice White's analysis of the permissibility of restraining speech applies equally well to the provi-
sion of nonpersonalized legal advice. According to Justice White, legislation that restrains speech is
permissible where it is a legitimate exercise of the power to regulate a profession; however, where the
speech falls outside the scope of a regulated profession, restraints on that speech would violate the
First Amendment. Justice White defines one who is "properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a
profession" as one who "takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise
judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client's individual needs and circumstances." 105 S.
Ct. at 2584. Thus, the publication of legal forms and general instructions should be permitted in all
states.
Yet, a few states bar the publication of legal forms and instructions. See Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300
So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1974) (rejecting argument that mere sale of legal forms and instructions was legal
because of lack of personal lawyer-client relationship; unauthorized practice begins when legal forms
are accompanied by instructions); Alaska Bar Ass'n v. Foster, C.A. No. 73-161 (Alaska Oct. 29,
1973), reprinted in 39 Unauth. Prac. News 75, 75-80 (1974) (injunction against kit sale, form prepa-
ration, and advice); Minnesota State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Reform, Inc., No. 396447 (Ramsey County
Dist. Ct. Minn. Apr. 18, 1975), reprinted in 39 Unauth. Prac. News 187, 188-93 (1975) (enjoining
sales of forms, form preparation services, and advice); State Bar v. Brandon (Clark County Dist. Ct.
Nev. Aug. 16, 1972), reprinted in 37 Unauth. Prac. News 32, 37-42 (1973) (enjoining provision of
kits and advice, and preparation of pleadings).
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depend upon the extent to which legal solutions are standardizable, " and
the extent to which the problem involves questions of fact whose resolu-
tion is not too difficult to ascertain. Legal claims for which the applicable
law is unambiguous and easily comprehended, and for which obtaining
the necessary factual material does not require discovery or other complex
fact-finding mechanisms, may be suitable for classroom instruction. Con-
versely, where the law is controversial, ambiguous, or has not been clearly
interpreted by the courts, classroom instruction would be inappropriate.
A. A Model Class on Summary Evictions
Although landlord-tenant law is a complex body of law, the scope of
knowledge necessary to render effective legal assistance in many cases can
be narrowly circumscribed. Case law on the timing of notice provisions,
the valid delivery of notice, and common defenses to evictions, such as
habitability, tender of rent, retaliatory eviction, and waiver, may be well-
established. In addition, the facts necessary to establish whether notice
was properly given, whether housing conditions violate warrants of habit-
ability,"1 or whether rent has been accepted by the landlord are not diffi-
cult to ascertain.
Presenting an example of a legal education class addressing summary
eviction proceedings may clarify how such a class would operate.6 2 The
attorney/instructor would inform the class-laypersons who have received
eviction notices-of the scope of the material that she intends to cover,
namely, the appearance, the answer, common defenses, trial preparation,
and negotiation. The attorney/instructor would distribute copies of an ap-
pearance, a reply, and pamphlets describing the summary eviction process.
She would begin by explaining the importance of filing an appearance, as
well as the consequences of not filing an appearance-default. She would
explain the filing procedure, where the court is, the court's assignment of
cases, and how long the pro se litigant can expect to wait before going to
trial.
Turning next to defenses, the attorney/instructor would describe each
of the common defenses: habitability, tender, waiver, and retaliatory evic-
tion. For habitability, she would inform the class that every person has a
60. The bulk of a legal services lawyer's work involves handling routine legal problems for indi-
viduals. See Special Project, supra note 9, at 618. Legal services programs commonly maintain stan-
dardized legal documents for routine problems.
61. In most cases, a tenant can easily identify the means by which she received notice from a
landlord-by mail, in person, or stuffed under the door. Similarly, determining the existence of hous-
ing violations may be obtained by requesting local housing authorities to evaluate the premises.
62. The instruction need not occur in a single session. The attorney/instructor may find it more
beneficial to divide the material into two sessions: one for the appearance, answer, and common de-
fenses; the other for trial preparation and negotiation.
1652
Vol. 96: 1641, 1987
Legal Education for Pro Se Litigants
right to a "fit and habitable" dwelling. She would describe conditions that
are unquestionably in violation of the warrant of habitability, such as the
lack of smoke detectors or the presence of lead paint. She would inform
the class that they can request an inspection from the local housing au-
thority if they believe they have a habitability defense. She would simi-
larly describe other defenses and the facts that are necessary to assert
those defenses.
The attorney/instructor would then discuss how to prepare for trial.
She might construct a replica of the local courthouse, to lessen the impact
of unfamiliarity or intimidation that a courtroom may evoke. She would
describe what a litigant may bring as evidence of her defenses, such as a
cancelled check in a tender defense, a copy of the housing authority report
in a habitability case, or photographs of alleged habitability violations.
In describing the possibilities of negotiation, the attorney/instructor's
goal would be to assist the tenant in negotiating an agreement that the
tenant can reasonably expect to keep. She would explain that it may be in
the interests of both the landlord and the tenant to negotiate an under-
standing, rather than to have both parties litigate the matter. If the mu-
nicipality provides for housing specialists, who assist parties in negotiating
their differences, she would explain the process involved in obtaining the
housing specialist's assistance. She would describe the interests that the
landlord has in avoiding trial or execution of the eviction, such as sheriff's
fees and possible attorney's fees. She would then assist the class in identi-
fying their individual objectives: whether a participant wishes to stay in
her dwelling or needs time to find another dwelling; the minimum and
maximum amount of time she may need to find another dwelling; whether
she has the money to pay the costs of moving; whether she has the finan-
cial means to negotiate a longer period of time through payment of use
and occupancy. The attorney/instructor would also discuss the conse-
quences of losing the case at trial, and the fact that in a nonpayment case,
the tenant may have as little as five days after judgment at trial before
execution of the eviction, as compared to other grounds for summary evic-
tion that would allow for longer periods of time before execution.
B. Addressing Participant's Questions
A class participant should be permitted to clarify her understanding of
the material presented. For the pro se litigant, the opportunity to ask
questions may constitute the greatest advantage of classroom education
over published, self-help materials. If a participant offers facts particular
to her situation, the attorney/instructor may wish to qualify her response
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to apply only to the facts offered.6 3 Since paralegals may not provide fact-
specific advice in light of unauthorized practice of law regulations, 4
paralegals conducting classes may either refuse to respond or choose to
explain the law in only general terms. Alternatively, legal services pro-
grams could provide attorneys at the end of class to answer fact-specific
questions.
III. THE ETHICAL PROPRIETY OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility set standards of professional conduct for law-
yers in those jurisdictions that have adopted them. 5 Violations of duties
imposed by either set of standards may result in disciplinary sanctions,66
and may also be used as evidence of malpractice.6" For this reason,
whether the proposed classroom instruction is consistent with the Model
Rules and Model Code is an important issue.
A. Legal Education as a Public Service
The American Bar Association has long approved of efforts by lawyers
to provide the public with information on legal problems of general inter-
63. For a discussion of the attorney/instructor's ethical duties, see infra Section III.
64. For a compilation of state unauthorized practice laws, see J. FISCHEIR & D. LACHMANN,
UNAUTHORIZED PRA(TrICE HANDBOOK 6-110 (1972).
65. As of February 18, 1987, twenty states had adopted the Model Rules, supra note 19: Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Washington and Wyoming. Letter from Nancy Katz, Assistant Counsel, American Bar Association, to
author (Mar. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Katz Letter]. As of September 24, 1985, one state, Virginia, had
officially rejected the Model Rules, and study committees in five other states-Illinois, Ohio, Oregon,
Tennessee, and Vermont-had recommended retention of the Model Code. See Rosiny, Debating the
Model Rules-Critical Points of Contention, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
The MoDEL. CODE, supra note 18, is currently in effect, with minor variations, in the District of
Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and twenty-seven states: Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Katz Letter, supra.
66. See MODEi. Rut.Fs, supra note 19, Scope ("Some of the Rules are imperatives .... These
define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline."); MOEt. CODE, supra note 18, Pre-
liminary Statement (anticipating use of MoDEt. CODE as interpretive guide by enforcing agency).
67. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (relying on Code
to interpret standard of attorney's negligence), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Lipton v. Boesky,
110 Mich. App. 589, 598, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (1980) (violation of Code is rebuttable evidence of
malpractice). Most judges and scholars, however, do not favor imposition of civil liability based upon
violation of the Model Code. See, e.g., Bob Godfrey Pontiac v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 330-31, 630 P.2d
840, 846 (1981) and cases cited therein; Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers
for Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORrSHAM L. REV. 1003, 1074-77
(1977); Thode, The Groundless Case-The Lawyer's Tort Duty to His Client and to the Adverse
Party, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 59, 73-74 (1979). Contra Comment, The Georgia Code of Professional
Responsibility: A Catalyst for Successful Legal Malpractice Actions?, 37 MERC.R L. RE:v. 817
(1986).
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est. It has consistently recognized the importance of educating the public,
and has approved dissemination of legal information through several dif-
ferent mediums: television programs,6 radio programs,69 seminars, 0 and
newspaper columns.71
The American Bar Association's position is reflected in the Model
Code's position on legal education.7 2 The Model Code encourages73 law-
yers to assist laypersons "to recognize legal problems,1 74 and specifically
urges lawyers to "participate in educational and public relations programs
concerning our legal system with particular reference to legal problems
that frequently arise."75
The proposed classroom instruction is clearly consistent with these as-
pirational duties since it would provide information on legal topics of gen-
68. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1179 (1971) (approving series of half-hour
television presentations on uses of life insurance in estate planning); ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Decision C-230(g) (1961) (lawyer's appearance on public service program, "Meet
the Press," proper); cf. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 298 (1961) (lawyer's ap-
pearance on public information television program is consistent with ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics, but simulation of judicial proceedings is not).
69. ABA Comm. of Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1136 (1969); ABA Comm. of Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. 1094 (1969) (radio program discussing court decisions, agency rulings, and giv-
ing lawyer's personal analysis of decision is ethical).
70. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 840 (1965) (interpreting prior, official
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics).
71. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1510
(1985) (under both Model Rules and Model Code, lawyers may author articles providing general
legal information for use in publications prepared for distribution to nonlawyers); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1198 (1971) (lawyer who writes for newspapers and magazines for
general public may identify herself as author under MOD:. CODE, supra note 18, EC 2-2, 2-5, DR
2-104(A)(4)); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Decision C-463 (1961) (approving ques-
tion and answer column confined to general treatment of legal subjects).
72. In contrast to the Model Code, the Model Rules do not specifically address the provision of
legal information to the public. However, they do express a more general policy of rendering public
interest legal service. Rule 6.1 urges lawyers to provide services at no fee or reduced fees; to partici-
pate in activities for improving the law, the legal system, or the legal profession; and to extend finan-
cial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. MODM. Rui.xS,
supra note 19, Rule 6.1. However, Rule 6.1 is not mandatory; thus, it is unlikely that it will have
much impact, if any, on whether the private bar will address the demand for legal services that legal
services programs cannot meet. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
In determining whether a legal information column published in a corporate newsletter was per-
missible, the American Bar Association noted that the Model Rules do not prohibit lawyers from
authoring articles providing general legal information. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1510, at 2 (1985).
73. Conduct inconsistent with an Ethical Consideration deserves attention to the extent that schol-
ars and members of the profession regard Ethical Considerations as creating ethical duties. See
Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A
Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L.
REv. 67, 74 (1981). Unlike Disciplinary Rules, Ethical Considerations are aspirational, not
mandatory; however, they "represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive." Monwt. CoInE, supra note 18, Preliminary Statement. As one commentator has noted,
Ethical Considerations "have elevated the practice and provided considerable guidance to ethically
sensitive lawyers-lawyers who, like most of us, want to do what is right." Rosiny, Debating the
Model Rules-Critical Points of Contention, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
74. Moiwi. CooiE, supra note 18, EC 2-2.
75. Id. EC 2-5.
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eral public interest. 76 In fact, as compared to television and radio pro-
grams and newspaper columns, classroom instruction is a superior
educational vehicle, for it provides the additional opportunity of clarifying
one's understanding of the material with the aid of the attorney/
instructor.
The proposed classes do depart, however, from "pure" education. Un-
like television, radio, and newspapers, which are aimed at the general
public, the classes would be aimed more narrowly at members of the pub-
lic who are interested in applying the material to their individual situa-
tions. While it may be true that information provided through television,
radio, and newspapers also attracts the attention only of interested mem-
bers of the public, the Model Code specifically discourages the use of pub-
licly-provided information:
A lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of educating mem-
bers of the public to recognize their legal problems should carefully
refrain from giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable
to all apparently similar individual problems, since slight changes in
fact situations may require a material variance in the applicable ad-
vice; otherwise the public may be mislead [sic] and misadvised. Talks
and writings by lawyers for laypersons should caution them not to
attempt to solve individual problems upon the basis of the informa-
tion contained therein.7
The admonition against acting upon the information provided makes
sense for those who have the capacity to hire counsel, but it ignores reality
for those who do not. The indigent, by definition, lack the capacity to hire
counsel. Advising the public not to rely on accurate legal information only
furthers the public's dependency upon the legal profession. While such
dependency might not be offensive if those unable to hire counsel could be
assured of obtaining counsel, the fact that the bar has not filled the gap
left by legal services programs renders the admonition against using pub-
licly-provided information particularly obnoxious.
Furthermore, the Model Code's approach to educating the public is too
narrow. The Model Code's approach, in effect, discourages attorneys from
76. Significantly, classroom instruction does not fall within the ambit of the "minimal service"
approach that was expressly rejected by the American Bar Association. ABA Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1359, at 1 (1976). The Committee, while expressing
sympathy for public interest attorneys operating under the constraints of limited resources, expressly
rejected the argument that "fairness and reason are best served by giving all indigents some although
perhaps inadequate legal advice" as inconsistent with the duty to represent a client competently.
However, the classroom instruction proposed here is informational; it does not trigger an attorney-
client relationship. In other words, classroom instruction cannot constitute "minimal service" precisely
because no legal "representation" is taking place.
77. MoiDEL CODE, supra note 18, EC 2-5 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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making information available that indigent pro se litigants cannot other-
wise receive, 8 and creates an all-or-nothing approach to the provision of
legal services: A layperson must either hire an attorney or proceed pro se
in virtual ignorance. Legal education should not stop at the point when it
educates the public to recognize a legal problem or to recognize the need
for an attorney's services. It overlooks the possibility that information
given in a public forum, when properly designed and limited to particular
areas of substantive or procedural law, can be accurate and valuable to
those who proceed pro se. Given the scarcity of legal services and the
potential value of providing legal information in a public forum, for both
the courts and the pro se litigant, classroom instruction should be viewed
as consistent with the ethical consideration that encourages lawyers to
support and participate in activities that aim to achieve equality before the
law.7 9
B. Legal Education as Practice of Law
Even if the proposed classroom education were not considered purely
educational, but were interpreted to constitute the practice of law, it
should nonetheless be considered permissible, since both the Model Code
and the Model Rules allow an attorney and client to limit the scope of the
attorney's assistance to the client.
First, however, the Model Rules do not define when an attorney-client
relationship exists.8" The question presumably is determined by state law.
In looking at judicial determinations of whether an attorney-client rela-
tionship exists, it is apparent that whether the relationship exists turns
upon the nature of the duty which the "client" seeks to impose upon the
lawyer. In most states, the attorney-client relationship is fundamentally a
78. The Model Code recognizes that "[tihose persons unable to pay for services should be pro-
vided needed services," MoDErL COD-, supra note 18, EC 8-3, but it does not address how that need
can actually be met. In fact, by assuming that all laypersons will have access to an attorney, the
Model Code takes a rather unrealistic approach to the problems facing the pro se litigant:
The prohibition against a non-lawyer practicing law does not prevent a layman from repre-
senting himself, for then he is ordinarily exposing only himself to possible injury. . . [Tihe
legal profession should help members of the public to . . understand why it may be unwise
for them to act for themselves in matters having legal consequences.
Morwi. Coiw., supra note 18, EC 3-7.
79. See MODEL CODE, supra note 18, EC 2-16.
80. MoDNl. Rvi.Es, supra note 19, Scope ("[Flor purposes of determining the lawyer's authority
and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a client-
lawyer relationship exists.").
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contractual one,"' the existence of which depends upon the actual inten-
tions of the parties and the specific circumstances.8 2
The Model Rules permit a lawyer to limit the scope and objectives of
legal assistance, provided the client consents.83 As long as the attorney
informs the client that she is free to seek other counsel on a different
basis,"4 the attorney has no obligation to offer the legal assistance the cli-
ent seeks.85 Thus, the attorney/instructor should initially inform prospec-
tive class participants that, although she is willing to provide them with
legal information, she does not intend to represent them as their attorney
and that the scope of the instruction is limited to issues actually discussed.
The attorney/instructor should probably obtain written acknowledgement
from each class participant before the classes begin.88
If the class participant is a client, according to Professors Hazard and
Hodes, "then all the professional duties that run in favor of clients attach
with full force."8" "The [attorney-instructor's] professional responsiblities
to class participants depend primarily on whether the class participants
are clients or not."88 The nature of an attorney's duties corresponds to the
scope of the representation: The attorney/instructor should not expect to
fulfill the duties that are normally imposed on the attorney in the tradi-
tional attorney-client relationship, provided the attorney/instructor is
careful to make clear the limited scope of her assistance.
81. Id. But see Torio v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (D. N.J. 1975) ("law of New Jersey
imposes duties incident to such relationship on one who merely 'assumes to give legal advice and
counsel.' . . . Neither contractual formality nor compensation or expectation of compensation is re-
quired" (citation omitted)).
82. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955; Kane, Kane & Kritzer, Inc. v. Altagen, 107 Cal. App. 3d 36, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1980); Miller v. Metzinger, 91 Cal. App. 3d 31, 154 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1979); cf. R. MAL-
I.EN & V. LEvrr, LEGAl. MAI.PRAcaICE §§ 101, 123 (1981).
83. "A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consulta-
tion." MoDEL Rut.Fs;, supra note 19, Rule 1.2(c).
84. See G. HAZARD & W. Hons)s, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RuL..s OF PROF-SSIONAi. CONDucr 28 (1985). According to one of the case examples, neither the
lawyer's "take it or leave it" proposition, nor the fact that the client may not be able to obtain counsel
willing to take her case on a different basis, makes the lawyer's conduct improper. Id. (Illustrative
Case (e)).
85. Id.
86. If she does not inform class participants that she is neither representing them, nor extending
the scope of her legal services beyond information, the attorney/instructor may unwittingly create a
relationship based upon a broader scope of services than she intended. If there is any doubt whether
an attorney-client relationship exists, and the attorney/instructor fails to protect the interests of the
class participants, she may be subject to malpractice liability. Id. at 49.
87. G. HAZARD & W. HonS, supra note 84, at 53. The principle professional duties prescribed
in the Model Rules include the duty to maintain confidences (Rule 1.6), to avoid conflicts of interest
(Rule 1.7), and to act competently and diligently (Rules 1.1 and 1.3), as well as other duties including
the duty to communicate (Rule 1.4) and the duty of fair dealing (Rule 1.8(a)). Id.
88. Id.; cf. R. MAi..EN & V. LEvrr, supra note 82, § 101 (circumstances creating attorney-client
relationship determine existence and extent of duty that attorney owes to client).
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IV. STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ATTORNEY: A TORT THEORY OF
LIABILITY
Since neither the Model Code of Professional Responsibility nor the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct envision the layperson's use of in-
formation publicly provided by attorneys, neither provides standards ap-
propriate to govern the conduct of the attorney/instructor. This Note pro-
poses that tort standards be applied to provide an incentive for attorneys
to exercise their professional responsibilities with prudence and care. 9 In
Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe,9" the Minnesota Supreme Court
applied general principles of tort in finding that an attorney-client rela-
tionship had been created. Togstad illustrates the reasonable expectations
of laypersons who receive information from an attorney and establishes an
appropriate tort standard to govern attorney conduct. A prospective client,
Togstad, had not yet retained the defendant law firm, but had approached
one of its attorneys for an initial consultation as to a possible malpractice
cause of action against her husband's attending physician. The attorney
advised Togstad that the facts were insufficient to support a medical mal-
practice suit. Ten months later, after the two-year statute of limitations
had expired, Togstad learned that there was a strong likelihood that the
attorney's advice had been erroneous. Although it was clear that Togstad
had never formally retained the law firm, the court nonetheless found that
an attorney-client relationship, sufficient to support a malpractice action,
had been created. The test which the court applied was whether the pro-
posed client "received legal advice . . . under circumstances which made
it reasonably foreseeable [to the attorney] that [the client] would be in-
jured if the advice were negligently given."'"
Clearly, the attorney's duty to exercise reasonable care in giving profes-
sional advice arose from the attorney's position as an expert on legal mat-
ters, and not from a contractual attorney-client relationship.92 Using this
tort approach, this Note proposes that two duties apply to attorneys who
provide legal information to pro se litigants: 1) the duty to render infor-
mation accurately and 2) the duty not to create an attorney-client
relationship.
89. Malpractice actions usually require the establishment of a contractual attorney-client relation-
ship, regardless of whether the suit is in contract or in tort. See Note, Attorney Malpractice: Use of
Contract Analysis to Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, 63 MINN. L. REV.
751, 752 (1979). Since this Note's proposal of classroom education for pro se litigants is premised on
the provision of general, non-personalized information and should not even constitute the practice of
law, see supra note 59, a class participant should be unable to establish a malpractice claim for lack
of a contractual attorney-client relationship.
90. 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980).
91. Id. at 693.
92. See Note, supra note 89, at 758.
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A. The Duty To Render Information Accurately
Like the attorney in Togstad, the attorney/instructor should have a
duty to render information accurately. Thus, an attorney should be liable
for information negligently rendered. In conducting a class for pro se liti-
gants, the attorney is well aware that the people seeking legal information
and advice are likely to rely, and act, upon the information provided. In
this sense, the attorney/instructor's position is no different from that of an
attorney in the traditional attorney-client relationship.
B. The Duty Not To Create an Attorney-Client Relationship
Unlike the attorney in a traditional attorney-client relationship, the at-
torney/instructor does not anticipate personal responsibility for applying
legal information to the facts of each pro se litigant's situation. Upon the
commencement of each class, the attorney/instructor must clearly and
carefully define the scope of her functions. She should advise participants
that the classes provide a source of information only, and that the attor-
ney/instructor will not take any actions on a participant's behalf. The
attorney/instructor should advise class members that they bear the re-
sponsibilities for filing legal documents and appearing in court.
Absent evidence to the contrary, the classes should be given a presump-
tion of no attorney-client relationship. If, however, the attorney/instructor
should create an expectation that she is accepting an attending layperson
as a "client," the attorney should bear the responsibility of falsely creating
any expectation of a traditional attorney-client relationship. Failure to
meet this responsibility should result in the imposition of duties flowing
from the traditional attorney-client relationship.
CONCLUSION
Many indigent civil litigants today are unable to obtain the services of
an attorney. In the absence of attorney representation, indigent litigants
should be afforded at least the opportunity to present effectively their legal
claims pro se. The dissemination of legal information to groups of individ-
uals cannot give pro se litigants the same level of expertise that attorneys
may possess; however, to the extent that it increases a pro se litigant's
knowledge of her legal position, increases the possibility of an effective
presentation of her position before the court, and decreases her depen-
dence upon discretionary assistance from a judge, such legal education
should be encouraged. Classroom instruction can be a valuable tool in
providing crucial legal information to litigants without counsel.
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